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a bstra ct : This article uses models to propose an explanation for 
three observations in comm unity ecology: the apparent overreaction 
of prey to attack by specialist predators, the existence of a common 
trade-off among components of competitive ability in communities 
of unrelated competitors, and the ability of invading species to break 
the native trade-off. Strategies that increase resource collection ability 
are assumed to increase vulnerability to attack by specialist consumers 
according to a vulnerability function. If competitors compete for a 
common resource and share the same form of the vulnerability func­
tion, then they are favored to converge on the same evolutionarily 
stable level of competitiveness or trade-off curve even if the param ­
eters describing their specialized consumers differ. The position of 
the comm on strategy or trade-off curve depends on the whole guild, 
with more speciose guilds tending to favor higher levels of compet­
itiveness. Invaders can break the native trade-off if they come from 
a guild with a higher trade-off curve, an effect possibly enhanced 
evolutionarily by escape from specialist consumers.
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This article proposes a testable explanation of three per­
plexing observations in communities of competing organ­
isms. Each is exemplified by the behavior of ants.
Apparent Overreaction to Attack by Specialist Parasitoids. 
An entire colony of native fire ants, Solenopsis geminata, 
will cease food collection when confronted by even a single 
phorid fly parasitoid (Feener and Brown 1992). It is un­
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clear what sort of cost-benefit analysis would be appro­
priate to assess this response (Abrams 1993).
Common Trade-Off among Components o f Competitive 
Ability. Both Fellers (1987) and Holway (1997) have shown 
that species of native ant follow the same trade-off between 
different components of resource-gathering ability, such 
as exploitation and interference competition. It seems un­
likely that a common constraint, such as resource allo­
cation, would produce the same trade-off curve across 
unrelated species.
Ability of Invading Species to Break the Native Trade-off. 
That the trade-off curve is not universal has been repeat­
edly demonstrated by highly successful invading species 
that can “break the rules.” Both the Argentine ant Line- 
pithema humile (Holway 1997 and in press) and the im ­
ported fire ant Solenopsis invicta are superior to native ants 
in both exploitation and interference ability. Why have 
none of the native ants found the secret to success (Da­
vidson 1998)?
The models presented here propose that evolutionary 
responses to specialist predators or parasitoids (hereafter 
referred to as consumers) explain these patterns. Many 
observations and models show that trade-offs between re­
source collection and surviving predation can support in­
termediate strategies (Lima and Dill 1990; Abrams 1993; 
Houston et al. 1993). When a single species is faced by a 
single consumer, the exact intermediate strategy favored 
depends on the efficiency and fecundity of that consumer. 
The models proposed here place species in a competitive 
context and show that appropriate symmetries in the in­
teraction between competitors and their consumers lead 
to a convergence of competitor strategies.
The models have three main structural components. All 
species compete for a common pool of resources (and are 
thus members of the same “guild”), have specialist con­
sumers, and use a common set of strategies to exploit those 
resources. Strategies that make a species an effective com­
petitor make it more vulnerable to attack by its specialist 
consumer. The “vulnerability function,” relating vulner­
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ability to competitive ability, has the same form for each 
species, although the specific parameters can differ. With 
these conditions, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) 
for coexisting competitors converges on a common shared 
strategy (when the strategy space is one-dimensional) or 
a common trade-off curve (when the strategy space is two­
dimensional). The position of this common strategy or 
trade-off curve depends on the properties of the entire 
community of competitors and consumers. I term this 
shared strategy the “balance of terror” because species re­
main in balance in response to their terror of being eaten.
Background
The models consider three primary issues: coexistence, 
invasions, and trade-offs between foraging and predation. 
I review literature on these three topics in turn and then 
discuss related models.
Coexistence
Three general mechanisms promote coexistence of species 
that share a habitat. First, competitors might have specific 
niches, such as specialized predators or resources, that 
regulate populations independently (Holt and Lawton 
1994). Second, there might be a trade-off between different 
modes of habitat exploitation, such as competitive ability 
and dispersal, guaranteeing that no one species is the best 
at everything (Bengtsson et al. 1994). Third, species might 
be sufficiently similar that processes excluding a particular 
species are too weak or slow to overcome stochasticity 
(Hubbell and Foster 1986). The last two mechanisms de­
pend on some sort of character convergence (Vadas 1990), 
either to a common trade-off curve or a common suite 
of traits. The coexistence in this article assumes that a 
specialist consumer defines the niche for each competitor.
Invasions
Invading species show that trade-off curves are not uni­
versal. Some invaders can join a community by exploiting 
empty niches or by leaving their specialist consumers be­
hind (Williamson 1996). Others can destroy a native guild 
by breaking the rules and freeing themselves from trade­
offs that constrain natives (Davidson 1998). For example, 
Holway (in press) has shown that Argentine ants are su­
perior at both exploitation and interference competition 
in a native community, lying above the native trade-off 
curve (Fellers 1987). Similarly, nonnative grasses have 
highly successful water-use strategies that are not exploited 
by natives (Baruch and Fernandez 1993; Williams and 
Black 1994; Holmes and Rice 1996).
Many studies have shown a trade-off between resource 
collection and surviving predation. Lima and Dill (1990) 
review the many changes in behavior induced by predation 
risk, and Houston et al. (1993) review models used to find 
optimal behaviors in the presence of such a trade-off. For­
agers must choose speed (Werner and Anholt 1993) and 
patches (Mangel and Clark 1988; Kennedy et al. 1994) 
based simultaneously on food and danger levels. Plants 
must choose levels of costly defense (Coley et al. 1985; 
Mole 1994). Brawling birds and fish must face up to the 
fact that escalated fighting behavior increases predation 
risk (Jakobsson et al. 1995). Shapely, rapidly growing bac­
teria are more vulnerable to predators (Nakajima and Ku- 
rihara 1994).
In defense theory, trade-offs are often thought of as 
balancing costs and benefits (Coley et al. 1985). This article 
addresses costs that are expressed in a competitive context. 
Traits for which competitive success creates higher vul­
nerability to consumers (Levin and Paine 1974; Levin et 
al. 1977; Pacala and Crawley 1992; Holt et al. 1994; Hulme
1996) are referred to as competition for enemy free space 
(Jeffries and Lawton 1984). Bergelson (1994) reviews lit­
erature indicating that costs of defense are higher in stress­
ful and competitive conditions.
Related Models
Many modelers have looked at the optimal trade-off be­
tween foraging success and predation (Houston et al. 
1993). I review models here that have examined evolution 
when the costs and benefits of strategies are mediated 
through susceptibility to attack and success in competition.
Holt et al. (1994) study the conditions under which 
competitors can coexist when they also share a predator 
but do not include an evolutionary component. The m od­
els in this article consider the evolutionary response of 
prey. Several models have examined competition mediated 
through evolution of predator behavior (Williamson 1993; 
Moody et al. 1996). Brown and Vincent (1992) studied 
coevolutionary models of predator-prey interaction, find­
ing the conditions under which a trade-off between com­
petitive ability and susceptibility to attack can support 
communities with more than one species.
Several models track the evolutionary response of a sin­
gle prey species to a consumer. Abrams (1992) showed 
that evolution might favor prey that overreact to attack, 
altering strategies so much that they have increased pop­
ulation size in the presence of predators. Similarly, Abrams 
(1993) showed that behaviors that trade-off surviving pre­
dation against foraging success will evolve to an inter­
mediate level and that avoiding predators can diminish
Foraging/Predation Trade-Offs
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population growth rates more than direct mortality (see 
also Werner and Anholt 1993). Abrams and Matsuda 
(1994) examined evolution of competitive characters that 
carry other costs, showing the possibility of oscillations 
between high and low levels of the competitive trait. As 
an even more extreme reaction, Matsuda and Abrams 
(1994) found that “timid consumers” could drive them ­
selves to extinction by steadily evolving lower and lower 
foraging rates to avoid predation.
Basic Model
Overview
The basic community consists of a set of competitors, each 
beset by a specialist consumer (Grover 1994; fig. 1). There 
are N, competitors of species i attacked by f" specialist 
consumers. Competitor fitness has two components, re­
source collection and survivorship, linked by their com­
mon dependence on the competitiveness parameter c,.
The vulnerability function h describes how vulnerability 
increases as a function of the competitiveness cr The over­
all vulnerability of competitor i depends on two properties 
of its specialist consumer: the area of discovery a, that 
measures per capita consumer efficiency (Hassell 1978) 
and the consumer population Pt that depends on consumer 
fecundity. For example, if h(c) is a linear function, each 
competitor will experience linearly increasing vulnerability 
to attack, although the slopes for different species can 
differ. '
The three structural assumptions are as follows. The 
competitors compete for a common resource R, have spe­
cialist consumers, and share a common strategy for ex­
ploiting the resource. The increasing vulnerability function 
h{c) quantifies how strategies that make a species an ef­
fective competitor make it more vulnerable to attack. All 
species share the same vulnerability function, even though 
the parameters determining area of discovery and con­
sumer population dynamics can differ.
Because this model has n competitors interacting with 
n +  1 resources (the actual resource and the n specialist 
consumers), it is easy to find parameter values that pro­
duce coexistence (Levin 1970; Armstrong and McGehee 
1980). Grover (1994) derived the general conditions for 
coexistence in models of this form. I will suppose that n 
species of competitors and their specialist consumers 
coexist.
Dynamics
Each competitor collects a share of the resource pool that 
is inversely proportional to the total competition T, ex­
perienced by that competitor. The total competition de-







Figure 1: Basic connections in the model: .V is the population of com­
petitor i with competitiveness < (ability to collect the resource 11). It is 
attacked by a population P. of specialized consumers with area of dis­
covery ii. Vulnerability h describes how increased competitiveness leads 
to higher vulnerability to attack.
pends on the number and competitiveness through the
Ti = 'Z  f(c„ c,)Nr (1)
The function f(c,, c, describes the effect one individual with 
competitiveness c, has on an individual with competitive­
ness cr. It must be increasing in ci and decreasing in c, and 
has scaling f(c,c) = 1 for any value of c. A competitor with 
a larger value of c: exerts more effect on other competitors. 
The sum acts as a surrogate for the resource (Adler 1990).
The fraction of competitors of species i that survive 
attack, g;, depends on the competitiveness c: through the 
vulnerability function h and the equation
(2)
The survivorship function F is a decreasing of its argument
x, = ctjhic^Pj, (3)
termed the “vulnerability” of competitor ;. The key as­
sumption driving the analysis is that the vulnerability func­
tion h and the survivorship function F must be the same 
for each competitor, although the parameters describing 
their consumers can differ.
The population N/ of competitors in the following gen­
eration is
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N-
N! = j g , .  (4)
The ratio N,/T, is the fraction of total available resources 
captured and converted into next year’s population of 
competitor i. This population is multiplied by the survi­
vorship g-. These dynamics are coupled to those of the 
consumers, which need not be specified explicitly.
f(c„ci) = J . (5)C;
In this case, c, might represent the per capita time spent 
foraging by competitor i. The total competition T, expe­
rienced by competitor i is
V 1 c i T  
T; = Z - N ,  = - ,  (6ct ' c,
Evolution
Each competitor experiences a trade-off between resource 
acquisition and vulnerability to consumer attack. We can 
thus look for the ESS level of c; (Maynard Smith 1982; 
Vincent and Vincent 1996). Suppose a new variant of com­
petitor i arises with competitiveness c, and population size 
N,. Because it shares consumers with the resident, the pop­
ulation in the next generation is
where
t  =  S  fCc,, Cj)Nj
and
gi = FlaMciWi)
when the invader is rare. The strategy of the resident ap­
pears in the total competition T, and in the consumer 
population Pt.
The framework of this model matches that underlying 
the ESS maximum principle (Vincent and Vincent 1996). 
The invader will succeed if its per capita reproduction 
exceeds that of the resident, which is 1 at equilibrium. A 
particular strategy c* is uninvadible if all invaders with 
q  ^  c* have per capita reproduction <1. When the resi­
dent strategy and its consumer are at dynamic equilibrium, 
the ESS occurs where the per capita reproduction g,./T; 
takes on its maximum for the values of P; and N l established 
by the resident strategy.
where T = S"., c,N(. The fraction of resources collected by 
competitor i is thus
N; _  ciN i 
T ~  T ’
meaning that each competitor species receives a fraction 
of food proportional to its own total competitiveness.
This model of exploitation competition assumes that 
the resource pool is divided up entirely among the mem­
bers of the guild even when population sizes are small. 
This might be an appropriate model for a resource like 
space that gets filled every generation or for highly fecund 
organisms that quickly reach a resource-limited carrying 
capacity. A more general model, consistent with slower 
population dynamics, includes resource depletion from 
other sources. A simple version represents depletion with 
the parameter /3 and takes the form
Because the qualitative results of the analysis are unchan­
ged with this more realistic form, the following analysis is 
based on the case with (3 = 0.
Particular forms of the vulnerability and survivorship 
functions simplify the analysis. Assume that
h(C;) = c"' (7)
for some positive power m, the same for each competitor. 
The value m = 1 is appropriate when cj represents time 
spent foraging.
A simple survivorship function F is based on the neg­
ative binomial distribution (Hassell and May 1973), used 
to avoid the unstable dynamics associated with the simpler 
Nicholson-Bailey model (Hassell 1978), and has the form
Existence of a Shared ESS with One-Dimensional p(x) = -------i-------; (8)
Strategy Set [1 +  (x/k)}1
In the simplest model of exploitation competition, the per where k is the negative binomial parameter. In general, 
capita effect is given by the ratio the equilibrium tends to be stable for lower values of k
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that aggregate attacks on competitors (Hassell and May 
1973).
With exploitation competition (eq. [5]), the ESS is the 
strategy that maximizes c;F(x;) because this is proportional 
to the per capita reproduction. Using h{c:) = c"' (eq. [7]), 
the derivative is
Suppose that each competitor is using its ESS strategy. 
Theng, = g* for each Combining these equations implies 
that
d dF
c(.F(x;) = F(x;) + cj——m alc"1 P- 
dc: dx:




1 +  (xfk)
(10)
for each /. Each competitor in a guild of competitors co­
existing on a single resource will evolve to share the same 
strategy.
Because each competitor has the same value of c* and
x*,
This equation depends only on x ; and is equal to 0 when a jP;(c‘ a P  = -
(c *)"
= P*
X, = X =
km — 1
g*= F(x*), (9)
as long as km >  1. If km < 1, the cost of higher competitive 
ability resulting from increased vulnerability never out­
weighs the benefit, and all competitors would evolve to 
ever increasing values of c; in the absence of other con­
straints. I consider only the case km > 1.
Equation (9) indicates that the common vulnerability 
and survivorship functions favor strategies that lead to 
equal vulnerability x* and equal survivorship g" for each 
competitor. The ESS competitiveness c, for competitor i is 
found by solving x* = fl,/i(c,)P„ or
a :P,
The ESS strategy of each competitor depends on the area 
of discovery a j and equilibrium population size P: of its 
consumers. Those blessed with inefficient or infrequent 
consumers can apparently use a higher value of c;.
This analysis, however, neglects the second key struc­
tural component of the models; all competitors coexist on 
a single resource. The population in the next generation
, N, ciN i 
N, = — g-, = — g,
(eqq. [4] and [6]). If the competitors coexist at an 
equilibrium,
where P* is the consumer pressure. At equilibrium, more 
efficient consumers must have lower population sizes (or 
they would have driven their food to extinction).
It might seem unlikely that the system would balance 
itself in this way. To see that it is possible, assume a specific 
dynamic for the consumers,
p;  = x,jv,(i -  gl.) (ii)
(Hassell 1978). The consumer fecundity A, can differ for 
each species, and Pf appears implicitly in g ;. At the ESS, 
the equilibrium (N,*, Pf) satisfies
p ; = x , j v ; ( i  -  g*) .
Multiplying both sides by a , and using the fact that
a ,p  = p:\
Pf = ttfPj = <1;X;JV;(1 — g *
The equilibrium population of competitor i is smallest for 
those competitors attacked by highly efficient or highly 
fecund consumers. Equilibrium values for both N  and P 
are decreasing functions of area of discovery a when all 
consumers have the same fecundity X (fig. 2A). When all 
consumers instead have the same area of discovery, equi­
librium values for P are constant and equilibrium values 
of N  are decreasing functions of fecundity (fig. 2B).
The exact value of the ESS competitive ability can be 
found by substituting the solution for N, into the equilib­
rium condition. At the ESS,
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With equal consumer fecundities ‘k
area of discovery a
With equal consumer areas of discovery a
Consumer fecundity A,
Figure 2: Dependence of competitor equilibria (A/), consumer equilibria (P), and optimal strategy (r) on the area of discovery a {A) and the 
fecundity X (B).
t  = ' 2 c n ;  = c* 'Z
p ,
a |A ,  1 — g"
Using the fact that T = c*g\ and the equation for Pf 
ESS value c* is
A x'
£*0  -  g*)
the
(12)
structure of the model still imposes a relationship among 
the ESS competitor strategies.
Suppose that competitors interact through the exploi­
tation competition (eq. [5]), that survivorship follows the 
negative binomial (eq. [8]), and that vulnerability follows 
a power rule as in equation (7) but with a different ex­
ponent ml for each competitor, or
/7,(c ,)  = c"‘ (13)
where
i i a ;K ■
The shared value of c* is thus larger when there are more 
competitors in the guild or when the consumers are either 
less efficient or less fecund on average (with the appro­
priate average being the harmonic mean of the product). 
If one competitor is blessed with extremely feeble con­
sumers, the whole guild responds with higher compet­
itiveness.
The results presented here carry over to more general 
forms of F and h and to forms o f /th a t model interference 
competition (results not shown). In these cases, the dy­
namics can become unstable, but the basic result of con­
vergence to a common strategy holds with unstable dy­
namics as long as the competitors coexist.
Results W hen Vulnerability Functions Differ
If the competitors do not share the same vulnerability 
function, they will not share the same ESS strategy. How­
ever, if they share the same survivorship function F, the




The survivorship g- = F(x*) does differ for different com­
petitors but depends only on the shape parameter m, and 
not on the consumer properties a; or P:.' Using the equi­
librium condition c;g ; = T, we can solve for c* as a de­
creasing function of mt. A competitor with a less steep 
vulnerability function (smaller »;,) should adopt a higher 
value of c; and ends up with lower survivorship (fig. 3).
An alternative model has competitors sharing the same 
vulnerability function as before, so that x : -  a :Pf'", but 
obeys
, CiN, ,
N' = ~ y s , F ( x ,),
where s, is a survivorship factor that could be different for 
each competitor species. As before, each competitor shares 
the same optimal x : -  x* (eq. [9]), but now c* is inversely 
proportional to sr A competitor with a low value of s, must
















T, = 2  f(^> c,> tpCOJV;. (16)
survivorship
strategy
2 4 6 8 10
power in vulnerability function, m
Figure 3: Response of competitiveness and survivorship when the value 
of in in the vulnerability function h(c) = c'"s differs for each species in 
the guild. Mortality follows the negative binomial with k = 0.5. Values 
shown assume a total competitiveness T = 5.
adopt a more competitive strategy to compensate and pays 
with lower overall survivorship as before.
Because I have been unable to obtain general results, 
the analysis in this section is restricted to a special case. 
However, I have not found any case, either analytically or 
through computer experimentation, that behaves quali­
tatively differently. Suppose that survivorship takes the 
negative binomial form
1
S, = F(R lx,) = F(K + , J  = | i -  |(- + - J / ~ ,  (17)
(as in eq. [8]), that h,, and hr are power functions
h,{b) = b"!,\ ht(c) = c ' \  (18)
and that the competitive effect is
h, c,
f(b;, q, b,, c,) = -  +  a - ,  (19)
' b, C;
Multiple Competitor Strategy Dimensions
When competitors have a single strategy dimension, the 
evolutionary dynamics push all competitors toward the 
same strategy, independent of the parameters describing 
the individual consumer. What happens when the strategy 
space is higher-dimensional? A two-dimensional model is 
diagrammed in figure 4. Competitor i has two strategies,
b, and c,, each of which may increase vulnerability to its 
consumer. In general, set the survival g, of competitor i 
to be
g, = F(y„ x,; (15)
where
where a can take on any positive value.
The per capita reproduction of competitor i is g,/T:, 
where
T, = 2  f(fy> c,-> bj> cj)N; = ~r +  a
for
P3 ) Consumers
a , W pi
a hc(c)P
a h(b)P„2 bv r  2
a h (c )P2 cv V  2 a3W P3
Vulnerability
y, = d^iib;)?; vulnerability due to strategy b 
x-, = fi;/j.(C;)f/ vulnerability due to strategy c.
Again, competitors share the vulnerability functions /?,, and 
hr and the survivorship function F but can have different 
consumer parameters a, a, and P.
The competitiveness function f(b,, c,, bjt c;) is also a 
function of both strategies, again describing the effect of 
one individual with competitiveness (bjy c() on an individ­
ual with competitiveness (£>,, c;). The total competition ex­





Figure 4: Connections in the general model with two strategic dimen­
sions. Each competitor has two strategies, b, and c,, that increase vul­
nerability to attack through the vulnerability functions lih and h., 
respectively.





















fixed value of b
1.5
Figure 5: ESS strategies (/I) and survivorships (B) of 10 different species when b, is a fixed value and only i affects vulnerability to consumers. 
Parameters are a = 2.0, k = 0.5, m, = 3.0. Parameter values for the 10 species are A = 2.3, 1.9, 1.8, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 1.7, 1.9, 1.4, 2.3; a = 0.9, 1.2, 1.3, 
0.7, 0.8, 1.1, 1.0, 0.6, 1.4, 1.3; and b = 1.3, 0.7, 0.8, 1.1, 1.0, 0.6, 1.4, 1.3, 0.9, 1.2.
T ^ ' Z b j N j ,  Tr = ' Z c lN r
Character Convergence with a Joint 
Vulnerability Function
Before addressing die truly two-dimensional case, suppose 
that survivorship is filtered through a single vulnerability 
function according to
X, = C;)Piy g; = F[Xj).
For example, assume that
h{bj, c,) = (
a reasonable form if c, is fraction of time spent foraging 
and b, is apparency while foraging. We can maximize the 
per capita reproduction by taking the partial derivatives 
with respect to bi and cj and setting them equal to 0. After 
some algebra, we find
2 km — 1
Evolution to Constraint Curve When 
Competitors Differ Intrinsically
This section treats the case where strategy b, is not linked 
to increased vulnerability and has evolved to some optimal 
value for each competitor as a result of other constraints. 
The following section allows both b; and c, to evolve when 
each creates increased vulnerability.
In the case at hand, strategy b; does not affect vulner­
ability, meaning that aj = y, = 0 for each i. Because /), is 
fixed, we maximize only over c,. Taking the derivative of 
the per capita reproduction with respect to c, and setting 
it equal to 0 leads to
T,- x \  Tb 7]
o — = m . 1 +  - f t , ---- h o
C: \ k \ b: C:
The equilibrium condition T, = g{ implies
Th T.
7  + f f -  = gi­f’; C:
Subtracting from the previous equation gives
bi = g.
1 — m,.x\ 1 +  — 
ki
As before, identical values of x, lead to values of b, = b" 
and C j-c *  that are identical for each competitor. This 
apparently two-dimensional model behaves like a one­
dimensional model because the vulnerability is one­
dimensional.
For a given value of b:, we can solve for the vulnerability 
x, and thus the survivorship g t. These different values can 
be substituted into the equilibrium condition to solve for
c, in terms of leading to a trade-off where those com­
petitors with higher values of b: have lower values of c, 
(fig. 5A).
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The resulting survivorships are shown in figure 5B. 
Those competitors favored with a higher level of the in­
trinsic parameter b, are willing to suffer lower survivorship, 
matching the pattern found when vulnerability functions 
differ (fig. 3). Strategy c shows the opposite pattern; com­
petitors with high values of c, have higher survivorship.
Evolution to a Constraint Curve When Both 
Strategies Can Evolve
Suppose that b, affects vulnerability through the function 
hb and is free to evolve. We maximize the per capita re­
production by taking its derivatives with respect to b-, and 
C; and setting them equal to 0,
X  „  x,
a — =  tn ,T ,------------------—,
C j 1 +  [(y; +  x,)/k]
Ti, T— = mhl Y i
b, ' 1 +  [(y  +  x^/k]'
Adding and dividing by T;,




Suppose b, takes on some value. Equations (21) and (22) 
are two equations for the two unknowns x, and yr Solving 
does not depend on the parameters a,- or ar These solutions 
can then be substituted into equation (20) to give c, as a 
function of b,. Again, the strategies fall along a trade-off 
curve even though the consumers of the two competitors 
differ (fig. 6A). The exact position of a competitor on the 
trade-off curve is determined by the properties of its 
consumers.
If mb = mr, equation (22) can be solved for y- +  x it 
meaning that every competitor will have the same survi­
vorship. Otherwise, competitors associated with a high 
value of the strategy with a lower value of m will have a 
higher survivorship (fig. 6B).
Discussion
Trade-offs between competitive ability and vulnerability to 
attack favor the evolution of intermediate trait levels 
(Abrams 1993). This article argues that a guild of com­
petitors, each competing for the same resource and each 
beset by a specialist consumer, will evolve to a common 
level of competitiveness independent of the particular pa­
rameters describing the consumer. The assumption re­
quired to maintain this balance of terror is that compet­
itors share the same vulnerability function, the functional 
form translating increased competitive ability into in­
creased vulnerability. When vulnerability functions differ, 
species with flatter vulnerability function evolve higher 
competitiveness and lower survivorship than the rest of 
the guild. Although there was not space to include the 
analysis, the general result holds when consumers are not 
exact specialists as long as each competitor is attacked by 
the same effective number of consumers or when the re­
source is simultaneously consumed by other organisms.
These results propose explanations for the three obser­
vations laid out in the introduction. First, overreaction, 
perhaps measured by a species giving up more biomass in 
lost foraging opportunity than in avoidance of predation, 
makes sense only in the competitive context of that species. 
In the presence of specialist consumers, a competitor with 
the potential for dominance may lower its resource gath­
ering effort to match the rest of its guild.
Second, when competitors .have two strategy dim en­
sions, at least one of which produces increased vulnera­
bility, evolution pushes them to fall along a common trade­
off curve. Trade-off curves are often thought of as a range 
of solutions to a common allocation constraint (Johnson 
et al. 1987; Stearns 1992; Mole 1994). The mechanism 
proposed here is fundamentally different, with allocation 
decisions constrained by ecological circumstances rather 
than resource limitation. The common allocation con­
straint is perhaps most likely to explain a trade-off curve 
when the competitors are phylogenetically related.
Finally, there is nothing to stop invaders that have left 
their specialist consumers behind from breaking free from 
the balance of terror and evolving steadily higher levels of 
competitiveness. Furthermore, the position of the trade­
off curve might be different in the invader’s native habitat 
(fig. 7). If that guild contains a larger number of com­
petitor species or a less fecund or efficient array of con­
sumers, the trade-off curve will be higher. Such invaders 
will have an immediate advantage, which provides a pos­
sible explanation for the phenomenon of biotic resistance, 
where more diverse communities are less susceptible to 
invasion (Case 1991).
The generality of these results depends on whether real 
populations of competitors are attacked either by specialist 
consumers or in the appropriate symmetrical way, and 
whether they truly compete for one or a few resources. 
Few communities have been studied in sufficient detail to 
check the assumptions (Pacala and Crawley 1992; Gold­
berg 1996). Where it has been studied, the community 
structure of consumers can be highly complicated (Haw­
kins 1994; M emmott et al. 1994).
The models could be extended in several ways. If species 
compete for several resources, will they still find a common 
trade-off? It is possible that the behavioral options opened
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Results are from a simulation.
up in this situation would break the pattern observed here. 
Patch selection often creates a trade-off between resource 
exploitation and attack by consumers. Would a model that 
explicitly included patch choice preserve the symmetry 
observed here?
The models presented here do not explicitly model be­
havioral response to the presence of specialized consumers. 
The competitive trait studied here can be thought of as 
the flip side of a constitutive defense. Would a model with 
optimal inducible responses (Adler and Karban 1994) 
show similar behavior? When consumer populations are 
roughly constant, the constitutive response modeled here 
approximates the average behavioral response to encoun­
ters with consumers and should provide a good approx­
imation of competitive success in exploitation compe­
tition.
The dynamics of consumer-resource interaction are sen­
sitive to the behavior of consumers (Abrams 1986, 1989). 
When consumers can choose among several competing 
species, each with its own strategy and level of vulnera­
bility, the functional response to those species strongly 
determines the selective forces. More sophisticated re­
sponses might significantly alter the results. Alternatively, 
the reproductive system in the competitors could alter 
evolution (for a discussion of the potential interaction 
between competitive environments and mating systems, 
see Proulx 1999).
Finally, the models neglect evolution of consumers 
(Brown and Vincent 1992). Because competitors evolve to 
a common trade-off curve even when consumers are de­
scribed by different parameters, changes in those param ­
eters over time might adjust only the position of the com­
mon trade-off curve. However, if consumers evolve at
different rates or evolve different vulnerability functions, 
the pattern might break down.
The operation of the balance of terror depends on the 
existence and similarity of the vulnerability function for 
different competing species. To my knowledge, the func­
tion connecting a particular competitive strategy with the 
risk of attack it engenders has not been measured in any 
system. Measurements of the costs and benefits of defenses 
(Karban and Baldwin 1997) can show a trade-off between 
growth rate and level of attack but have yet to estimate 
the shape of the resulting curve. If such curves could be 
feasibly measured in a single guild, the theory predicts that 
the guild will lie along a trade-off curve and that com­
petitors should avoid strategies capitalized on most effec­
tively by their particular consumers.
If measurements of vulnerability functions reveal suf­
ficiently similar forms among competitors, what predic­
tions does the theory make? First, the model predicts that 
the responses of competitors to consumer attack, such as 
those of the native fire ant (Feener and Brown 1992), act 
to lower the resource gathering potential of this species to 
match those in the surrounding guild. Colonies from areas 
with more species of competitor should not respond as 
much to the threat of attack. Second, when there are two 
strategy dimensions, survivorship should be higher for 
those competitors that have high values of the strategy 
associated with the flatter vulnerability curve.
Invading species should rapidly evolve more competitive 
traits that make them more susceptible to the consumers 
they left behind (Blossey and Notzold 1995). As long as 
the consumers are absent, the native species suffer from 
the “double whammy” of a nonnative competitor that has 
been released both numerically and evolutionarily from
Balance o f Terror 507











Figure 7: A, Trade-off curve in a hypothetical guild with many species. Each cross represents the ESS strategy of one consumer species. B, Trade­
off curve in a hypothetical guild with few species (circlcs). An invader from the speciose guild (cross) would lie well above the local trade-off curve.
attack. The evolutionary response of the invaders to this 
release is sure to take some time, perhaps explaining the 
observation that many invaders expand their range rapidly 
only after an initial period of slow growth (Veit and Lewis
1996).
However, this evolutionary response might make in­
vaders highly vulnerable to biological control. In partic­
ular, if invaders come from a community where the bal­
ance of terror favors relatively high competitive levels, the 
initial response to attack in a new community might be 
insufficient, leading to extremely high mortality. More 
speculatively, it is possible that the evolution of the highly 
successful polygynous form of the imported fire ant in 
North America (Porter et al. 1988) is only possible because 
it has escaped from some unknown pathogen. These col­
onies reproduce by budding rather than through a single 
queen and should thus be more susceptible to transmission 
of pathogens. Were the pathogens to be introduced, the 
more competitive polygynous form might no longer 
succeed.
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